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Abstract
We analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and government policies on firms’
aid take-up, layoff and furlough decisions using newly collected survey data for 10,642
small, medium and large Danish firms. This is the first representative sample of firms
reporting the pandemic’s impact on their revenue and labor choices, showing a steep
decline in revenue and a strong reported effect of labor aid take-up on lower job sepa-
rations. First, we document that relative to a normal year, a quarter more firms have
experienced revenue declines exceeding 35 percent. Second, we characterize the firms
that took up aid and the type of aid package they chose — labor-based aid, fixed cost
support or fiscal-based tax delays. Third, we compare their actual layoff and furlough
decisions with reported counterfactual decisions in the absence of aid.
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1 Introduction
A large part of the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic happens through firms and
the labor-based decisions they make. Social distancing requires all but the most essential
employees to either work from home or not go to work at all. Approximately 40% of workers
in Denmark have jobs that allow them to work from home (Dingel and Neiman; 2020), a figure
that is similar to other high-income European countries and the United States. Governments
across the world have adopted emergency policies that focus on employment subsidy, cost
subsidies and tax (VAT) delays. In particular, government support for furloughing employees
of private firms has been a popular policy, as it facilitates public health by enabling social
distancing and helps reduce firm costs.
We analyze the potential impact of three types of government aid on how firms manage
their workforce in response to the pandemic collecting new survey data from 10,642 firms
in Denmark. The Danish government has offered aid packages that share many similarities
with the policy response in other countries, providing a lens to help understand the potential
impact of government aid programs elsewhere. Our representative sample covers small,
medium and large firms with 3 to 20,000 employees across all industries. We ask firms about
pandemic-related disruptions to their normal operations, with a focus on alternative labour
arrangements and government aid take-up. We also collect data on baseline firm employment,
costs, and liquidity, as well as perceptions on the crisis and the recovery period.
We report three main findings. First, firms in Denmark, as elsewhere, were hit hard
by the pandemic but there is significant heterogeneity of the impact. Second, we show that
government programs in Denmark are likely to have had a strong and positive effect on labor
retention. Third, we focus on the different types of aid policies and find that employment
subsidies have the strongest correlation with the targeted labor choices, while we find a
weaker correlation with cost subsidies. We find mixed evidence for tax subsidies with no
clear impact on labor choices. Taken together, we interpret our results as strong evidence
that targeted government policy can be successful in helping firms stay afloat and creating
incentives for firms to retain their employees, thereby reducing the country’s aggregate level
of unemployment during the pandemic. Our estimates suggest that the aid policies in this
context helped to reduce layoffs by approximately 81,000 jobs, and increased furloughs by
285,000.
To consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on revenues, we compare reported
changes in revenues with the distribution of changes in revenues in a normal year. We show
that a quarter more firms in early 2020 are experiencing a negative revenue shock larger
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than 35 percent (the threshold for aid eligibility), relative to 2016. We document that the
impact was felt similarly across the firm size distribution, with the bulk of the variation
attributed to industry differences. While at least half of the firms in almost all industries
report decreases in revenue, some were hit much harder than others. As elsewhere in the
world, industries in accommodation and food services were severely affected with an average
of 73 percent decrease in revenues, as were arts/entertainment (69 percent decrease) and
education (50 percent decrease). Retail and manufacturing were also badly affected, with
nearly 70 percent of firms reporting decreases.1 About 34 percent of firms report no impact
or a positive impact on revenue. We find that firms that have taken up government support,
however, tend to be those firms that report being in the highest levels of distress.
Our second main result is that there is a strong relationship between government aid
and how firms manage their employment relationships. While we find that firms’ primary
response to the crisis has been to furlough a large share of their workforce, they report that
without government support they would have expected to instead enact layoffs. The average
firm taking aid furloughed 30 percent and laid off only 2 percent of workers. Without aid,
they predict that they would have furloughed closer to 17 percent and laid off 25 percent of
workers. We find a strong correlation between the magnitude of the revenue decrease and
the share of workers that are furloughed and laid off, suggesting the policy was effective.
Our third main result focuses on the relative relationship between each of the three types
of aid and firm choices. We find labor subsidies to have a strong and consistent relationship
with more furloughs and fewer layoffs across specifications. Firms receiving cost aid tend to
report fewer layoffs, though they only furlough more workers if the firm also takes labor aid.
Firms taking on fiscal aid tend to be less worse-off, and the impact on labor outcomes is not
as clear. We take this as evidence that firms taking on labor aid are primarily doing so for
the intended reason of keeping workers on the payroll, though impact of other types of aid
is less clear.
Related literature
Our study adds to the emerging rapid-response literature documenting the economic toll
on firms and workers around the world. Bartik et al. (2020) surveyed approximately 5,800
small firms in the USA and found that almost half of the businesses temporarily closed with
many cutting their labour forces by nearly half. Looking at start-ups, Sterk and Sedláček
(2020) estimate a substantial loss in employment that is likely to extend beyond a decade,
even under a “short slump” scenario. However, some firms are also doing better. For
1The average decrease in revenue in manufacturing and retail was 22 percent and 25 percent, respectively
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example, Albuquerque et al. (2020) show that firms with high social ratings and advertising
expenditure outperform others with higher returns and lower volatility. Similarly, Amore
et al. (2020) show that firms with controlling family shareholders are more resilient and have
fared better during the pandemic. Our data is the first representative sample including the
full firm size distribution and industry composition, allowing for an economy-wide evaluation
of the impact of aid programs on labor decisions.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the labor market effects of the pandemic.
Barrero et al. (2020) estimate 42 percent of recent layoffs will become permanent job losses.
Del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) estimate that the shocks could cause a 22 percent drop in
GDP, 24 percent job losses and 17 percent reduction in total wage income. Coibion et al.
(2020) use a household survey from Nielsen in the US to document job losses as large as
20 million by early April, far surpassing official unemployment numbers. Alstadsæter et al.
(2020) use real-time register data to report that close to 90 percent of layoffs in Norway
are temporary, though suggest that some smaller, less productive firms may be enacting
permanent layoffs. Some studies have started to document the characteristics of workers
most affected. Montenovo et al. (2020) show that communication-related workers and female
Hispanics with large families aging from 20 to 24 are more prone to lose jobs. Hensvik et al.
(2020) use data on vacancy postings to document that the pandemic is shifting job-seekers’
search behavior, moving their searches towards “less hit” jobs. While administrative datasets
can provide evidence on actual outcomes, our survey elicits predictions for the counterfactual
labor outcomes in the absence of government aid, allowing for a new type of evaluation.
Finally, our work also relates to the literature on the impact of government policy on real
economic outcomes, though work on the microeconomic implications of government policy
has not yet been prolific. Cororaton and Rosen (2020) look at the impact of US Paycheck
Protection Program, reporting that while half of public firms were eligible to apply, only 13%
ultimately became borrowers. They suggest additional eligibility requirements may help in
targeting most financially constrained firms. There have also been notable contributions on
the macroeconomic literature, including Faria-e Castro (2020); Caballero and Simsek (2020);
Balajee et al. (2020) and Elgin et al. (2020). We evaluate firms responses to a set of popular
government policies.
2 Institutional setting
The government policy packages in Denmark are similar to packages offered by other coun-
tries in Europe and around the world. They have focused on providing subsidies for retaining
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employees, propping up businesses with fixed cost grants and allowing for deferral in tax
obligations. We briefly describe each in turn, and provide a summary table of government
programs in selected countries in the Appendix. The costs of the aid programs in Denmark
are estimated to be close to 100 billion Danish kroner (14.7 billion US$, 13.4 billion Euro)
and are expected to allow 100,000 jobs to be retained (Finansministerium; 2020).2 This
figure is within the margin of error of our estimates.
Labor-related support: furlough support and sick leave
The Danish government is subsidizing 75 percent of salary costs, subject to a cap, for employ-
ees that otherwise would have been fired as a result of financial stress caused by COVID-19.3
The requirement for a company to be eligible is that it otherwise would have fired a min-
imum of 30 percent of its employees and that employees spend five days of holiday before
becoming eligible.4 Furloughed employees are not allowed to work, such that those working
from home are not eligible for this policy.
Other countries have enacted similar policies. In Germany, Italy and the UK the gov-
ernment subsidizes up to 80 percent of the salary costs for furloughed workers. The Dutch
government subsidizes 90 percent of wages if firm revenue is expected to decrease by 20
percent, and in France the compensation level is 70 percent subject to a cap. Sweden does
not subsidize furloughs, but subsidizes a reduction in hours worked to 80 percent of capacity
with workers receiving 90 percent of their salary. The United States has an additional direct
payment to citizens, beyond unemployment insurance.
Cost-related support: fixed costs and cancelled events
To help firms survive and cover their immediate costs, governments have offered various non-
salary cost subsidies, including 25 to 80 percent of fixed costs if the firm experiences between
35 to 100 percent reduced turnover. Firms facing lock-down are compensated for 100 percent
of fixed costs. In Sweden, the government compensates up to 75 percent of costs for firms
experiencing at least 30 percent reduction in turnover. In the Netherlands, firms in distress
2As of 18 May 2020, the government had committed around 1.5 billion US$ in employment subsidies for
firms. As of 22 May, the government had received 31,000 applications of which 28,000 had been approved.
These covered 211,000 jobs — equivalent to 161,000 full time jobs (Andersen et al.; 2020).
3In Denmark, social-security benefits are paid through general taxes. European countries have a minimum
number of days for sick leave, which has to be covered by the firm. In Denmark, the government is covering
the first month of sick leave that would have normally been the responsibility of the firm.
4Our survey elicits predictions of the share of employees that would be laid off, and we do not observe a
discontinuity at 30 percent.
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can apply for a EUR 4,000 lump-sum payment while in Germany firms with fewer than 10
employees can expect a direct payment of up to EUR 15,000. The French government also
offers a lump sum transfer of up to EUR 1,500 for the self-employed or small businesses with
a drop of 70 percent or more in revenue. The UK has a similar cash grant based on the prior
three years profit, with a cap at GBP 2,500 per month and the Italian government has a
regional fund set up to help small firms with redundancy payments. The Danish government
is also offering compensation for cancelled events.
Fiscal-related support: tax deferral and loans
A number of countries are also delaying tax payments, such as value added tax (VAT)
payments and payroll taxes. Denmark, Germany, Sweden, UK and the Netherlands all have
corporate tax deferral schemes, and the United States has a 50 percent payroll tax reduction
for affected firms that do not carry out layoffs and delayed corporate tax filings. France,
similarly, has instituted early corporate tax repayments and postponed employers’ social
security contribution. In Italy, there is a six month suspension of loan repayment for small
and medium sized firms.
To help firms cope with short term liquidity problems, many governments are offering
loans or loan guarantees. The Danish government is offering a loan guarantee of 70% of new
corporate loans if a firm’s operating loses exceed a set threshold.5 The Swedish government
has instituted a similar policy, but without distinctions in firm size and cap. In Germany and
Italy the loan guarantee is 100%, though Germany has a cap at 25 percent of firm revenue.
France has a loan guarantee of 70-90 percent, with the maximum depending on firm size,
while the UK has a guarantee with a cap for small and medium sized firms and 80 percent
for large firms. The Netherlands offers a loan guarantee of 50 percent, while the United
States is instead offering low-interest federal loans to affected small businesses.
3 Data and methodology
We developed a self-respondent survey that was sent out on 23 April 2020 to 44,374 firms;
effectively the entire population of firms with more than 3 employees in Denmark. The
survey is sent to a special email inbox for government mail, which yields a substantially
higher response rate than regular email surveys. Participation was voluntary, and no financial
5For small and medium-sized firms, the threshold is 50 percent. For large firms, the threshold is 30percent.
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compensation was offered to respondents.6
3.1 Methodology and characteristics
We received 10,642 responses by 1 June 2020 yielding a response rate of 24 percent. The
responses were fairly balanced across firm size and industry, though there was a relatively
stronger response rate from larger firms. We estimate that the survey respondents represent
between 20 and 40 pct of the private labor market in Denmark.7 Our industry mix is
similar to the industry mix in the total population, highlighting that our final sample is
representative at a firm size as well as industry level.8
The survey included a total of 23 questions, including basic firm characteristics (such as
employment in January, revenue change between January and April, closure status, costs
and liquidity) and a series of questions on government aid take-up and labor choices. The
survey included a list of available aid packages and asked respondents to mark the packages
they used. All firms were asked to report the number of employees they furloughed and
laid off as a result of the pandemic, and firms that reported taking aid were also asked to
report the number of furloughs and layoffs that they would have expected to enact if they
had not taken aid. Our main results are based on survey data and the figures reported by
the respondents.
3.2 Validation
There is an inherent trade-off in using administrative register data and survey data: register
data are official and while the reports are verified by the government, data is not timely
and still susceptible to biased responses as whatever firms report matters for administrative
purposes.9 Survey data, on the other hand, is more flexible on timing and can be responsive,
though it relies on truthful reporting with no downside to misreporting. As such, the onus
is on the researchers to validate the survey responses. We briefly outline the steps we took
to verify our data.
6The survey was carried out by Epinion, a private survey firm in Denmark. The respondent managers
will receive a special advance report with our findings after the completion of the survey. The report also
provides a benchmarking of the individual firms’ answers against a relevant group of other firms.
7See the Data Appendix for a thorough description of the data and response rates. Our firms self-reported
700,000 employees covering both part-time and full time employees. For some large firms, the response may
also cover subsidiaries within and outside Denmark.
8We provide an online Data Appendix with details on the survey and its representative nature relative
to the population.
9For example, when there are thresholds for reporting requirements (Garicano et al.; 2016).
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First, the survey respondent is crucial in the quality of the data. In our survey, over
90 percent of the respondents were owner-managers or CEOs, and thus know (or make) the
financial and labor choices in the firm.10 Further, all firms have a unique firm identifier
allowing for links to accounting register data up to 2019 and Danish Statistics data up to
2016, allowing for further verification.
Second, there are concerns regarding the quality of the reporting. In our context, the
two main concerns are regarding truthfulness in reports of actual furloughs and layoffs, and
accuracy in the predictions of the counterfactual figures. We can directly test the veracity
of the reported actual furloughs against government register data on aid requests, but the
veracity of the counterfactual predictions are inherently un-testable. We have to assume
that these firm managers are in the best position to make these sorts of predictions for their
own firms, and we can consider whether we see bunching at the aid threshold levels in the
data. Bunching could suggest managers did not carefully answer the question and simply
defaulted to the value they thought was the minimum acceptable, but we do not see evidence
of this in the reports.
4 Results
The majority of firms — 66 percent — reported a negative impact of COVID-19 on their
revenue, while about 26 percent report no change and about 8 percent report an increase
in revenue. The median firm in our sample expects to face a 20 percent revenue decrease,
while the median firm reporting a decrease expects a 35 percent decrease.
4.1 The reported impact of COVID-19 on firm revenue
Figure 1 plots the distribution of the reported revenue change in the shaded bars, and
overlays the distribution of revenue change for the population of similar firms between 2015
and 2016 in the outlined bars.11 While in any given year many firms experience decreases
in revenue, including substantial decreases beyond 35 percent, the decline reported in April
2020 is unprecedented. In total, 40 percent more firms face declines in revenue relative to
firms in 2016. The overlaid line plots the difference between the cumulative distribution
functions of both distributions at each bin interval. It shows that 7 percent more firms face
revenue declines of more than 90 percent, while 20 percent more firms have declines of more
10The remainder of the respondents were non-managing owners or other administrative staff.
11The “normal times” data is from 2016 as that is the latest available date in the register data. It includes
the population of limited liability firms in Denmark with more than 3 employees.
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than 50 percent, and over a quarter of firms face declines in revenue of more than 35 percent.
This pattern is similar across firm size bands, though the magnitude of the reported impact
is heterogeneous across industries. While nearly all industries have over half of the firms
reporting expected decreases in revenue, some industries are particularly hard hit — such
as accommodation and food services, arts and entertainment, education, manufacturing and
retail.12
4.2 Government aid take-up
Our data suggest that the bulk of firms taking up government aid in Denmark are, in fact,
those in the most need. The majority of firms reporting no expected change in revenues
also report not being aid recipients.13 Approximately 56 percent of firms in our survey
reported taking advantage of one or more government aid programs, with nearly all firms
experiencing revenue decreases beyond 50 percent taking some form of aid. Out of the
remaining 44 percent that did not take aid, about half chose not to do so despite being
eligible.
Figure 2 summarizes the aid take-up relationship with revenue change impact at the
industry level. Each circle represents an industry at the 1-digit NACE level, and the size
of the circle shows the relative share of firms accounted for by each industry. Firms in
accommodation and food — the hardest-hit industry — are the firms most likely to take
on aid. Retail and manufacturing report revenue declines that are at the median, and have
approximately 60 percent of firms taking on aid.
Firms could take up all packages they are eligible for, and they were not mutually ex-
clusive. Table 1 reports the set of firm characteristics that correlates with aid take-up of
each type and combination of packages. We iterate across a set of indicators as the depen-
dent variable and linear probability models starting with whether the firm took up any aid
package, and subsequently iterating through the possible package combinations. Column
(1) includes all firms in the sample, while the remaining columns include only the firms that
took on any aid at all. The last rows in the table indicates the share of firms and employment
that account for each of the policy types.
Column (1) reports that approximately 56 percent of firms took on aid, and they were
less likely to do so if they reported no change, or an increase in revenues. Larger firms were
slightly more likely to take up aid, and more affected industries were more likely to take up
12We provide a more thorough descriptive exercise of the firm size and industry differences in the Data
Appendix.
13The median firm reporting not receiving any aid has an expected revenue change of zero.
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aid. Column (2) shows that nearly 11 percent of all firms took on all three aid types (20
percent of aid-taking firms), relative to choosing only one or two bundles. This choice was
more common for hard-hit sectors, but we find no relationship with firm size.
The outcome variables of Columns (3) through (5) take on a value of one if the firm
took on only either labor, cost or fiscal aid, respectively. While a sizeable share of aid-takers
chose only labor aid (about 19 percent) or only fiscal aid (22 percent), a much smaller share
(4 percent) took on only cost aid. In general, industry characteristics predict take-up of
labor-only and fiscal-only aid, while they fail to do so for cost-only aid. The direction of
revenue change is not correlated with take-up of labor-only aid, but firms not experiencing
a decrease are less likely to take up cost-only aid and more likely to take up fiscal-only aid.
The most affected industries are also much less likely to take up fiscal-only aid. The patterns
are relatively consistent when we consider the possible bundles including two types of aid in
Columns (6) through (8).
In all, these correlations suggest that firms not experiencing distress are less likely to take
up most types of aid (with the exception of fiscal aid), especially in bundles of two or three
types. The relationship between firm size is economically small and mixed, and industry is
most often the strongest predictor of taking a particular type of bundle.
4.3 The effects of aid on employment decisions
Firms that took aid were more likely to furlough and less likely to layoff workers relative
to non-aid takers. Figure 3 shows that, among firms receiving aid, the share of workers
furloughed is increasing with the firm’s revenue losses, suggesting the policy is having the
intended effect. The layoff shares for aid-taking firms seems largely independent of the
size of the revenue loss. Firms that did not take aid enact more layoffs than furloughs if
they experience a revenue decrease of more than 50 percent, but at lower distress levels the
difference is not statistically significant.
However, we cannot draw conclusions about the effectiveness of aid policies from a simple
comparison between aid takers and non-takers, as taking aid is naturally a choice and not a
random assignment.14 If firms taking aid were more likely to furlough workers in response to
a revenue shock instead of laying them off, the observed differences in employment decisions
could overstate the policy’s effects.
14In time we may be able to observe identifying thresholds of eligibility, but our data suggests that 53
percent of firms that were eligible to take aid chose not to do so.
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Estimates based on stated counterfactuals
In an effort to address the self-selection of firms into the different aid packages, we asked
respondents to report their expected counterfactual choices. Among firms that took aid, we
asked what share of workers they would have laid off and furloughed in the absence of aid.
Under the assumption that firms report counterfactual outcomes accurately, we can identify
the average effect of treatment on the treated for each of the policy options. Furthermore,
we can also observe how firm’s adoption of different aid packages is correlated with their
outcomes in the absence of treatment.
Our analysis requires an assumption that the reported counterfactuals are correct. While
this may seem strong, in the absence of clear experimental variation in aid packages our alter-
native is to assume that selection of these aid packages is random (conditional on observable
covariates in the data). A simple comparison between aid takers and non-takers would imply
an assumption that the counterfactual outcomes for a firm that took aid can be proxied by
the outcomes of a firm with similar characteristics that did not take aid. Economic models
of selection are predicated on the notion that firms know their business, and as such should
be able to foresee immediate alternative outcomes. In this sense, our approach could be
superior to a quasi-experimental designs. The primary concern in this scenario is that firms
may not report their counterfactuals carefully, even if they are capable of doing so. In this
section, we consider evidence about the validity of the counterfactual reports and alternative
estimates based on more conventional assumptions about selection on observables.
Table 2 reports estimates of the effects of the effects of labor aid, cost aid, and fiscal aid
on the share of workers furloughed and laid off. Columns (1) and (2) focus only on aid-takers,
and the dataset includes two observations for each firm: one corresponding to their actual
furloughs and layoffs, and one that reports their counterfactual furloughs and layoffs they
say they would have chosen in the absence of aid. Using these data, we estimate a model:
YjT = α + βL0 Lj + βC0 Cj + βF0 Fj + T ×
(
βL1 Lj + βC1 Cj + βF1 Fj
)
+Xjγ + εjs (1)
where firms are indexed by j, and T = 0 if the observation measures the firm’s reported
outcomes in the absence of aid, and T = 1 if it measures the firm’s actual outcomes. The
key variables are binary indicators for whether the firm took labor aid (Lj), cost aid (Cj),
or fiscal aid (Fj). Recall that these aid packages are not mutually exclusive; firms can
take up any combination of the three. The coefficients βL0 , βC0 , βF0 measure differences in
counterfactual outcomes for firms that took up particular aid packages. The coefficients
βL1 , β
C
1 , β
F
1 measure the difference in observed outcomes, relative to counterfactuals, for a
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given aid package. Firm-specific controls, Xj, include log of January employment, the size
of the revenue change, and industry at the 2-digit NACE level. The term εjT captures
idiosyncratic reporting error and other factors that affect layoff and furlough decisions.
We interpret βL1 , βC1 , βF1 as effects of treatment on the treated — that is, the average
effect of each policy on the firms that take them up.15 Firms that took labor aid increase the
share of furloughs by 25.6 percentage points; a magnitude consistent with the evidence in
Figure 3. The reduction in layoffs from taking labor aid is -6.0 percentage points. Cost aid
also increases the furlough share, but by a smaller margin: 3.9 percentage points.16 Cost aid
also reduces layoffs by 6.8 percentage points. For labor aid and cost aid, the effects have the
signs that would be predicted by theory, and intended by policymakers. Fiscal aid, however,
is estimated to increase layoffs by 1.1 percentage points, and we cannot rule out negative
effects on furloughs. While unclear, this could be simply reflecting selection into this type
of aid.
Our estimates of βL0 , βC0 , βF0 measure selection into treatment on the basis of counterfac-
tual outcomes. The coefficients suggest that firms choosing labor aid expected 4.8 percentage
points more furloughs, and 13.5 percentage points more layoffs, relative to firms that also
took aid but chose different packages. Hence, the firms that took labor aid are those that
also had expected to enact relatively high layoffs and furloughs. Firms that took cost aid had
expected significantly higher layoffs, but not furloughs. Firms taking fiscal aid also expected
slightly higher furlough share (1.6 pp) and layoff share (2.4 pp).
Estimates based on selection on observables
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 are based on comparisons of actual reported outcomes
between firms that took aid and firms that did not. These are identified under the assumption
that firms’ counterfactual outcomes in the absence of aid are well-proxied by the actual
outcomes of the firms that did not take aid. This assumption, albeit implausible, is a useful
benchmark model to compare against our analysis based on stated counterfactuals.
For this analysis, we are estimating a standard cross-sectional model:
Yj = α + βLLj + βCCj + βFFj +Xjγ + εj (2)
where the variables and parameters have interpretations analogous to equation (1). We
assume E[εj|Lj, Cj, Fj, Xj] = 0.
15Under the aforementioned assumption that firms accurately report counterfactuals.
16Firms that want to furlough workers can pair cost aid and labor aid.
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Under these modeling assumptions, the estimated effects of the different aid packages on
the share of workers furloughed and laid off are, in fact, similar to those estimated based
on stated counterfactuals in Columns (1) and (2). Comparing the two sets of estimates is
useful to help us understand the nature of the selection bias introduced by firms’ choice of
aid packages. Under both models, labor aid leads to large increases in the share of workers
furloughed and substantial reductions in the share of workers laid off, albeit smaller. This is
what the policy is intended to do: firms that take labor aid would have laid off more workers
without aid, but they cut layoffs roughly in half and substantially increased furloughs. If
the counterfactuals are accurate, firms furloughed significantly more workers than they had
planned to lay off, suggesting that the policy not only saved employment matches, it also
encouraged firms to put workers on leave who might have otherwise stayed on the job. While
under normal circumstances inducing furloughs would be undesirable, it is certainly not so
in the context of the pandemic, where a key goal is to encourage social distancing.
With regard to cost aid, the picture is somewhat less clear. Both models indicate that
cost aid increases the furlough share by 3.9 to 5.7 percentage points, but the models disagree
about the effect on layoffs. In the model based on stated counterfactuals (Columns 1 and
2), cost aid is estimated to reduce layoffs by 6.8 percentage points. In the model of selection
on observables (Columns 3 and 4), cost aid has no discernible effect on layoffs.
This difference could arise if firms taking cost aid would have higher layoffs in the absence
of aid than firms that did not take aid. The evidence on selection in Column (2) suggests
this could be the case. Focusing on the results for cost aid in Columns (1) and (2), we
would conclude that cost aid encourages reduced layoffs and increased furloughs. Unlike the
case for labor aid, cost aid seems to reduce layoffs by more than it increases furloughs. One
interpretation is that taking cost aid encouraged firms to keep workers on the job that they
might otherwise have been forced to lay off. When firms can offset payments of rent or other
fixed costs, they may redirect funds to keeping workers employed who might have been laid
off. To be sure, less than 1 percent of workers are employed in firms that only take cost aid,
as most firms that take cost aid bundle it with another policy (see Table 1).
The results for fiscal aid consistently indicate that it has no effect on furloughs, and a
small, but statistically significant positive effect on layoffs. Firms that take only fiscal aid
employ around 16 percent of all workers, so even this small increase in layoffs could have a
significant impact on the total number of workers who lose their jobs. Furthermore, taking
fiscal aid alone is more likely among firms who did not experience revenue declines, and that
are not in the most affected industries (see Table 1, Column 5). Still, the mechanism through
which increased fiscal aid would lead firms to lay off a larger share of their workforce is not
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clear. Perhaps firms that defer tax payments or take government-backed loans lay workers
off to restructure in anticipation of future loan payments. As the goal of fiscal-type aid is
targeted at non-labor outcomes — such as, for example, firm survival and longevity — we
will only be able to evaluate these relationships with additional data in due time.17
5 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused widespread disruption to lives and livelihoods across
the world. We analyzed its reported impact on firm outcomes and the likely effect of firm-
based aid programs. Our survey sample covers approximately 24 percent of firms in Denmark
with more than 3 employees, and it is representative for the population with respect to size
and industries.
The crisis was hard hitting for nearly 70 percent of firms, with the median firm expe-
riencing a decline of 20 percent of revenue. Over one quarter more firms reported revenue
declines in this period relative to firms in 2016. Firms experiencing declines in revenue were
the primary takers of government aid, standing is in stark contrast to the reports of aid take-
up in other countries, such as the United States.18 The most common aid package taken up
included support for labor furloughs and delays in VAT payments, with a non-trivial share
of firms also taking on aid to cover fixed costs.
We have documented that receiving government aid has a strong impact on reported
labor choices: firms that took up aid report furloughing more and laying off fewer workers
than they would have, absent government aid. However, the relationship varies with the
kind of aid that firms take-up: we find a strong and clear relationship between taking up
labor aid and reporting lower layoffs and more furloughs, while the relationship for firms
taking up cost aid is mixed, with lower layoffs but lower furloughs contingent on also taking
on labor aid. While we do not find the same relationship for firms taking up fiscal aid, the
most expensive aid program, the effect is hard to cleanly identify. We report that financial
distress is not correlated with higher take-up of fiscal aid, nor is being in a hard-hit industry.
Further, while it is not clear that take-up of fiscal aid is correlated with furloughs, it is too
early to detect the potential impact on liquidity, costs and survival. These outcomes are
more likely to be the goal of the fiscal aid subsidy, and we leave the effect of these policies
17Our survey included questions on cost changes, cost shares and firm liquidity. However, these questions
had much lower response rates relative to the rest of the survey. As such, we leave exploring this type of
outcome to future work including register data and leave some exploratory basic descriptive statistics in our
Data Appendix.
18Reports such as Silver-Greenberg et al. (2020) are widespread in the US news media.
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as important questions for future work.
Our analysis is important and, we hope, useful for policymakers in this turbulent time.
As our survey response rate was high and yielded a highly representative sample across
firm size and industry, we have one of the best datasets available today to examine the
impact of COVID-19 pandemic on firms and their responses to government policy. The
policy program implemented in Denmark is quite similar to policy programs in many other
countries, including Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Further, some portions of
the program are similar to others beyond Europe across the world. As such, our results can
be helpful as economists consider the potential effects of such programs across countries with
different institutional contexts.
15
References
Albuquerque, R. A., Koskinen, Y., Yang, S. and Zhang, C. (2020). Love in the time of
covid-19: The resiliency of environmental and social stocks.
Alstadsæter, A., Bratsberg, B., Eielsen, G., Kopczuk, W., Markussen, S., Raaum, O. and
Røed, K. (2020). The first weeks of the coronavirus crisis: Who got hit, when and why?
evidence from norway, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Amore, M. D., Quarato, F. and Pelucco, V. (2020). Family ownership during the covid-19
pandemic, Available at SSRN 3598256 .
Andersen, T., Svarer, M. and Schrøder, P. (2020). Rapport fra den økonomiske ekspertgruppe
vedrørende udfasning af hjælpepakker, Technical report, Aarhus University.
Balajee, A., Tomar, S. and Udupa, G. (2020). Covid-19, fiscal stimulus, and credit ratings,
Fiscal Stimulus, and Credit Ratings (April 15, 2020) .
Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N. and Davis, S. J. (2020). Covid-19 is also a reallocation shock,
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bartik, A. W., Bertrand, M., Cullen, Z. B., Glaeser, E. L., Luca, M. and Stanton, C. T.
(2020). How are small businesses adjusting to covid-19? early evidence from a survey,
Working Paper 26989, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Caballero, R. J. and Simsek, A. (2020). A model of asset price spirals and aggregate de-
mand amplification of a" covid-19" shock, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y. and Weber, M. (2020). Labor markets during the covid-19
crisis: A preliminary view, Working Paper 27017, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cororaton, A. and Rosen, S. (2020). Public firm borrowers of the us paycheck protection
program, Available at SSRN 3590913 .
Del Rio-Chanona, R. M., Mealy, P., Pichler, A., Lafond, F. and Farmer, D. (2020). Supply
and demand shocks in the covid-19 pandemic: An industry and occupation perspective,
arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.06759 .
Dingel, J. I. and Neiman, B. (2020). How many jobs can be done at home?, Working Paper
26948, National Bureau of Economic Research.
16
Elgin, C., Basbug, G. and Yalaman, A. (2020). Economic policy responses to a pandemic:
Developing the covid-19 economic stimulus index, Columbia University .
Faria-e Castro, M. (2020). Fiscal policy during a pandemic, FRB St. Louis Working Paper
(2020-006).
Finansministerium, D. (2020). Danmarks konvergensprogram 2020.
URL: http://fm.dk/media/17913/danmarks-konvergensprogram-2020.pdf
Garicano, L., Lelarge, C. and Van Reenen, J. (2016). Firm size distortions and the produc-
tivity distribution: Evidence from france, American Economic Review 106(11): 3439–79.
Hensvik, L., Le Barbanchon, T. and Rathelot, R. (2020). Job search during the covid-19
crisis, Available at SSRN 3598126 .
Ministeriet, B. (2020). Tripartite agreements.
URL: https://bm.dk/arbejdsomraader/politiske-aftaler-reformer/politiske-
aftaler/trepartsaftaler/
Montenovo, L., Jiang, X., Rojas, F. L., Schmutte, I. M., Simon, K. I., Weinberg, B. A.
and Wing, C. (2020). Determinants of disparities in covid-19 job losses, Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Regeringen (2020). Enige om at justere og udvide hjælpepakker til dansk økonomi.
URL: www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/2020/regeringen-og-alle-folketingets-partier-er-enige-
om-at-justere-og-udvide-hjaelpepakker-til-dansk-oekonomi/
Sterk, V. and Sedláček, P. (2020). Startups and employment following the covid-19 pandemic:
A calculator.
17
Exhibits
Figure 1: Density Distribution of Actual and Expected Changes in Revenue
Notes: The outlined bars plot the distribution of the value of the actual change in revenue between 2015 and
2016, using Danish register data for the universe of firms with more than 3 employees (N = 73,498). The
shaded bars plot the distribution of the reported revenue change from the authors’ survey of firm managers
responding to the effect of COVID-19 on their firms (N = 10,642). The COVID-19 survey was sent to
over 44,000 firms with more than 3 employees, had a 24 percent response rate and yielded a representative
sample along firm size and industry categories.
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Figure 2: Share of firms taking up aid programs on industry and expected change in revenue.
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Notes: Data from author’s COVID-19 survey. This graph reports the industry-level average revenue change
(x-axis) and the industry-level average aid take-up (y-axis), weighted by industry size. Each circle represents
an industry at the 1-digit NACE level, and the size of the circle shows the relative share of the economy
accounted for by each industry.
19
Table 1: Regression results: policy choice
All types Only one type 2 types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any aid All three Labor Cost Fiscal Labor+Cost Labor+Fiscal Cost+Fiscal
Revenue change
Increase -0.459*** -0.181*** 0.042 -0.030*** 0.336*** -0.123*** 0.002 -0.046***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.030) (0.008) (0.035) (0.006) (0.029) (0.008)
No change -0.420*** -0.164*** 0.018 -0.045*** 0.369*** -0.115*** -0.009 -0.053***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.018) (0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004)
Firm characteristics
Ln(employment) 0.022*** 0.005 0.007* -0.015*** 0.003 -0.030*** 0.044*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Industry
Manufacturing 0.128*** 0.048 0.100*** 0.006 -0.237*** 0.053** 0.108*** -0.079**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.023) (0.058) (0.025) (0.034) (0.039)
Construction 0.015 -0.018 0.180*** 0.008 -0.175*** 0.025 0.078** -0.098**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.024) (0.060) (0.025) (0.035) (0.039)
Retail 0.178*** 0.100*** 0.121*** -0.013 -0.308*** 0.087*** 0.104*** -0.092**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.023) (0.057) (0.024) (0.033) (0.039)
Accm/Food 0.366*** 0.373*** -0.040 0.017 -0.441*** 0.222*** -0.050 -0.081**
(0.033) (0.039) (0.035) (0.025) (0.057) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040)
Professional 0.086*** 0.048 0.069* -0.004 -0.199*** 0.075*** 0.070** -0.059
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.024) (0.059) (0.027) (0.035) (0.040)
Education 0.267*** 0.234*** 0.111*** -0.013 -0.458*** 0.242*** 0.006 -0.123***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.042) (0.025) (0.057) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040)
Arts 0.228*** 0.091* 0.098* 0.009 -0.359*** 0.215*** 0.066 -0.120***
(0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.034) (0.066) (0.053) (0.048) (0.042)
Observations 10505 5868 5868 5868 5868 5868 5868 5868
Share of firms (total) 0.555 0.107 0.106 0.023 0.124 0.077 0.092 0.027
Share of empl (total) 0.569 0.101 0.141 0.006 0.159 0.028 0.127 0.007
Share of firms (aid) 1.000 0.193 0.190 0.041 0.223 0.138 0.165 0.049
Share of empl (aid) 1.000 0.177 0.248 0.010 0.280 0.049 0.223 0.012
Notes: ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All columns are linear
probability models, estimated with OLS. Each outcome variable is an indicator for each type of aid. The omitted category from revenue impact
is “experienced a decrease in revenue”. Log of employment is calculated based on reported employment in January. Regressions include industry
dummies at the 1-digit NACE level, reporting only selected industries based on relevance (share of the economy) and relative impact.
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Figure 3: Labor Response to Revenue Change by firms aid taker status
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Notes: This graph shows the binned scatterplot of the simple relationship between the percentage revenue
change in firms and the share of employees that they report actually furloughing or laying off. Squares
show the relationships for the outcome of actual layoffs. Solid squares represent firms that took at least
one type of aid, while hollow squares represent firms that did not take aid. Circles show the relationships
for the outcome of actual furloughs. Solid circles represent firms that took at least one type of aid, while
hollow circles represent firms that did not take aid.
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Table 2: Regression results: aid takers and non aid takers
Only Aid Takers All firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Furlough Layoff Furlough Layoff
Aid eligible -0.020*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.002)
Observed outcomes
Labor aid 0.256*** -0.060*** 0.269*** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Cost aid 0.039*** -0.068*** 0.057*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Fiscal aid -0.011 0.011*** -0.008 0.007***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
Reported counterfactuals
Labor aid 0.048*** 0.135***
(0.008) (0.007)
Cost aid -0.000 0.122***
(0.010) (0.008)
Fiscal aid 0.016** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.006)
Firm controls 3 3 3 3
Industry 3 3 3 3
Observations 10540 10678 9267 9267
# Firms 5270 5339 9267 9267
Notes: ***, **, and * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors
in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) are estimated on a sample that only includes workers who actually
took aid. Each firm has two observations: one with its actual outcomes, and one with the outcome in the
absence of aid, as reported in the survey. The coefficient estimates for labor, cost, and fiscal aid in the top
panel correspond to actual firm outcomes. The bottom panel corresponds to counterfactual outcomes, as
described in equation (1). Columns (3) and (4) use data on observed outcomes for all firms. All models also
include: revenue loss, log of January employment, and unrestricted industry effects at the 1-digit NACE
level.
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ONLINE APPENDIX—NOT FOR PUBLICATION
“Preserving job matches during the COVID-19 pandemic: firm-level evidence
on the role of government aid,” June 15, 2020
A Data Appendix
A.1 Sample characteristics
The Danish COVID-19 survey was sent to 44,374 firms; effectively the entire population
of firms with more than 3 Track changes is off Track changes for everyone Track changes
for daniela.scur Track changes for holmog Track changes for mobe Track changes for ian
schmutte Track changes for Malte Jacob Rattenborg Track changes for You Track changes
for Frederik Plum Hauschultz Track changes for jwe Track changes for guests Current file
Overview Recompile 13 employees in Denmark. The survey was sent out on 23 April 2020,
and by 1 June 2020 we had received 10,642 responses, yielding an overall response rate of
24 percent. This Data Appendix provides details on the sample characteristics and how
representative the sample is relative to the Danish population of firms with more than 3
employees.
Table A.1 shows the number of respondents within each employment size band, the
response rate and the proportion of each set of firms in our sample and in the population.
While we had a higher response rate among larger firms relative to small firms, the final
share of firms sampled from each size band is not vastly different from the share of firms in
the total population. Figure A.1 shows the cumulative distribution function for our sample
and the population firm size. In all, approximately 45 percent of the firms in our sample
have fewer than 10 employees, while 40 percent have between 10 and 50, and 15 percent
have more than 50 employees.
Similarly, the industry mix in our sample is relatively similar to the industry mix in
the total population, and with fairly similar response rates across industries. The bottom
panel of Table A.1 reports the response rates, sample and population shares for the largest
industries in the sample. The representative nature of our sample in terms of industry
composition is depicted in Figure A.2, where we plot the share of firms within each of
the NACE 1-digit industries in our sample and in the population. Some industries were
slightly over-sampled (like manufacturing and professional/technical services) while others
were slightly under-sampled (like construction), but all are quite close to the 45-degree line.
A.2 Response rates
The overall response rate we received was relatively high for this type of non-incentivized,
voluntary survey. As all questions were voluntary, not all survey questions had the same
response rate. Table A.2 reports the response rates by firm size and industry for our main
variables. Effectively all respondents provided answers to the establishment employment
size, share of furloughed workers and share of laid off workers. Less than half, however,
responded to the labor cost share, fixed cost share and liquidity questions. If there was
App. 1
Table A.1: Distribution of Survey Responses
Resp
N
Popn
N
Response
rate
Share
in sample
Share
in popn
Firm size
3-5 emp 3202 15768 0.20 0.30 0.36
6-9 emp 2283 10488 0.22 0.22 0.24
10-25 emp 2817 10860 0.26 0.27 0.24
26-50 emp 1063 3801 0.28 0.10 0.09
51+ emp 1200 3457 0.35 0.11 0.08
Industry
Accommodation/Food 472 2840 0.17 0.04 0.06
Construction 1477 7182 0.21 0.14 0.16
Manufacturing 1561 5416 0.29 0.15 0.12
Other 2406 10497 0.23 0.23 0.24
Professional/Technical 1116 3892 0.29 0.11 0.09
Publishing/Broadcasting 788 3001 0.26 0.07 0.07
Wholesale/Retail 2745 11546 0.24 0.26 0.26
Total 10565 44374 0.24 1.00 1.00
Notes: This table reports the sample counts and response rate for our COVID-19 impact survey. The top
panel reports the respondent numbers across firm size bands, and the bottom panel reports the respondent
numbers across different industries. Column “Resp N” reports the total number of survey respondents.
Column “Popn N” reports the total number of firms in the population. Column “Response rate” reports
the response rate as the difference between the number of respondents and the population within the firm
size band or industry. Column “Share in sample” reports the share of firms represented in each size band or
industry relative to the entire sample — the number of respondents divided by the total sample. Column
“Share in popn” reports the share of firms represented in each size band or industry relative to the entire
population of firms — the number of respondents divided by the total population count.
App. 2
Figure A.1: Cumulative Distribution Function of Firm Employment
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Notes: The red line represents the cumulative distribution function of firm employment in our survey
sample. The blue line represents the cumulative distribution function of the remainder of the population of
firms in Denmark with more than 3 employees. Employment truncated at 99th percentile (300 employees)
for exposition. Population N = 33,513. Sample N = 10,642.
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Figure A.2: Industry Composition of Sample Firms
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Notes: Each circle marker in the graph represents an industry-level share of firms, as they appear in the
sample and in the full population. Industry markers above 45-degree line means industry is over-sampled.
Industry markers below the 45-degree line means the industry is under-sampled. Population N = 33,513.
Sample N = 10,642.
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Figure A.3: Firm size distribution within industry, population
(a) Population
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(b) COVID-19 Survey Sample
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Notes: Population N = 33,513. Sample N = 10,642. Industry defined by 1-digit NACE codes. Graph
shows the distribution of firm size (number of employees) in the population and in the sample for each
industry.
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selection in the type of firm that chose to respond to these questions, it does not seem to
have been across firm size and industry. The share of respondents across the various size
bands and industry categories is relatively similar.
Table A.2: Survey Response Rates
N Empl Furlough Layoff LaborCosts
Fixed
Costs Liq
Firm size
3-5 emp 2652 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.39 0.38 0.38
6-9 emp 2039 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.40 0.39 0.41
10-25 emp 3110 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.39 0.38 0.37
26-50 emp 1217 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.40 0.39 0.40
51+ emp 1534 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.36 0.35
By industry
Accommodation/Food 472 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.51 0.51 0.44
Construction 1477 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.27 0.26 0.31
Manufacturing 1560 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.32 0.37
Other 2419 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.39 0.38 0.36
Professional/Technical 1118 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.50 0.48 0.43
Publishing/Broadcasting 787 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.52 0.47
Wholesale/Retail 2746 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.36 0.38
Total 1511 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.42 0.41 0.40
Notes: As survey questions cannot be mandatory, the response rates of individual questions vary. This
table reports the response rates of the main variables in our analysis for each size band and industry group.
Column “N” reports the number of observations in each group. “Empl” reports the share of firms that
responded to the question on the number of employees question. “Furlough” reports the share of firms that
responded to the question on the share of employees that were furloughed. “Layoff” reports the share of
firms that responded to question on the share of employees that were laid off. “Labor costs” reports the
share of firms that responded the question on labor cost shares. “Fixed costs” reports the share of firms that
responded the question on fixed cost shares. “Liq” reports the share of firms that responded the question
on liquidity availability.
A.3 Direction of revenue change
We document that, in general, the direction of the revenue change is relatively similar across
firm size bands, and the majority of the variation is driven by industry. Figure A.4a shows
the expected change in revenue across the firm size bands, and Figure A.4b shows the same
data across industries.
App. 6
Figure A.4: Expected Direction Change in Revenue
(a) By firm size
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Notes: See Table A.1 for the sample size of each industry and size band in the sample. The figure shows
the share of firms reporting an expected decrease, increase or no change in revenue as a result of the
pandemic. Panel (A) shows the distribution across firm size bands, and Panel (B) shows the distribution
across industries.
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A.4 Other outcomes: costs, liquidity and survival expectations
Cost and liquidity
Approximately 40 percent of the respondents chose to report their monthly costs in January
and April, as well as the share of their costs accounted for by labor and fixed costs, and
their available liquidity (including cash-on-hand and available loans). Table B.3 reports
the average value of these responses by three different types of firms: firms experiencing
different levels of revenue change, by their aid recipient status, and by firm size.
All firms reported lower costs in April relative to January, though the share of costs taken
up by labor or fixed expenses remained relatively similar. Likewise, liquidity remained stable
across the two months.
B Policy Appendix
On 14 March 2020, the Danish government, labour unions and employer organizations
reached an agreement that included temporary salary compensation for employees at risk
of losing their jobs, effective for the period from 9 March 2020 to 9 June 2020 (Ministeriet;
2020). On 18 April 2020 the government aid packages were extended to 8 July 2020 and
also substantially expanded (Regeringen; 2020).
App. 8
Table B.3: Costs and liquidity, averages
Mo. costs
(Jan)
Mo. costs
(April)
Lab. share
cost (Jan)
Lab. share
cost (Apr)
Fix share
cost (Jan)
Fix share
cost (Apr)
Liq (Jan)
100k Kr.
Liq (Apr)
100k Kr.
Decrease 31.43 21.98 0.58 0.59 0.31 0.35 45.87 44.12
Increase 40.68 28.75 0.56 0.58 0.29 0.30 50.06 52.32
No change 31.96 24.20 0.57 0.59 0.29 0.31 50.05 51.20
By aid recipient
Did not take aid 37.02 26.22 0.58 0.60 0.29 0.31 52.21 52.46
Took aid 29.49 21.06 0.58 0.58 0.31 0.35 43.95 42.49
By firm size
3-5 emp 4.85 2.89 0.58 0.59 0.32 0.35 19.06 18.22
6-9 emp 8.09 5.58 0.59 0.60 0.30 0.33 22.10 21.70
10-25 emp 17.89 12.83 0.59 0.60 0.30 0.33 38.85 38.01
26-50 emp 39.78 27.10 0.57 0.58 0.29 0.33 67.66 66.73
51+ emp 140.22 106.08 0.54 0.55 0.30 0.33 139.10 138.00
Total N 4225 3971 4017 3897 3894 3782 4083 4039
Notes: The table reports financial indicators of surveyed firms in terms of monthly cost in January(column 1), monthly cost in April (column 2),
labor cost shares in January (column 3), labor cost shares in April(column 4), fixed cost shares in January(column 5), fix cost shares in April (column
6), liquidity in January (column 7) and liquidity in April (column 8) across groups with different revenue change expectations, aid recipients and
firm size. Last row of the table reports number of total observations for each indicator.
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Table B.4: Summary of firm aid government programs.
Country Furlough support Loan and grant Cost subsidy Others
Denmark - 75% of employee salaries are
covered by the government,
up to DKK30,000 per em-
ployee per month. Eligibil-
ity: firm would layoff at least
30% of its workers. Firm cov-
ers the remaining 25% of the
salaries.
Loan guarantee on 70%
of new corporate loans re-
lated to COVID-19. Eli-
gibility: SMEs with losses
of 50% or more. Large:
revenue losses of 30% or
more.
Between 25% and 80%
of fixed costs for firms
experiencing between 35
and 100% decreases in
turnover, but remaining
open. 100% of fixed costs
are compensated for firms
forced to close.
Employers are paid
sickness reimburse-
ment for salaries
and benefits from
to first day of ab-
sence instead of the
30th. 30 day VAT
payments delay.
Germany - Govt covers up to 80% (87 if
family) of salaries and 100 %
of the social-security contri-
butions for reduced working
hours. Working hours can be
reduced with reduced wages.
Eligibility: at least 10 % of
workers affected
100% - loan guarantee up
to 25% of the revenue of
2019. Max EUR 500k in
loans for firms with 10-50
employees and 800k for >
50 employees.
Direct payment to self-
employed and firms with
10 employees or less, up
to EUR 15,000.
Reduced VAT rate
to 7% for restau-
rants for 12 months
Sweden - Employers can cut the work-
ing hours by 80%. Gov-
ernment covers most of the
salary, workers receive 90%.
- Loan guarantee of 70%
to companies, up to SEK
75 million in loans per
company. No legal com-
pany size limit
Between 22.5% and 75%
of fixed costs for firms
with min SEK 250k in
turnover and a decrease
of at least 30% this year.
VAT by sole propri-
etors might be post-
poned.
Netherlands Up to 90% of wages are com-
pensated. If: At least 20%
decreases in revenue in March
to May compared to 2019 and
the workers are not laid off.
- Loan guarantee of 50%,
min EUR 1.5m and max
EUR 150m per company.
Firms forced to close
can apply for EUR 4000
lump-sum payment
VAT, income, cor-
porate and turnover
taxes might be de-
ferred.
France 70% of wages, up to EUR
45.68 per hour not worked,
are compensated, if a busi-
ness is forced to close or
reduce activities due to
COVID-19.
- 70 % to 90% of loans
might be guaranteed by
the State. - Different per-
centages of guarantees ap-
ply to different sizes of
firms
Lump-sum transfer of up
to EUR 1500. For:
Very small businesses,
self-employed etc., if de-
creases of 70% in revenue
or forced to closure
Early corporate
tax repayment,
postponed employ-
ers social security
contribution
Italy - 80% of salaries covered, with
a maximum of EUR 1.200 for
a maximum of 9 weeks.
Fee-free loan guarantee for
SMEs, EUR 5mmax guar-
antee
regional fund to assist
firms with redundancy
payments for 9 weeks of
suspension for a max of 5
employees
6 months suspension
of loan repayment
for SMEs
UK Up to 80% of salaries with
a maximum of 2,500 GBP
are paid for the next three
months for retained workers.
All employers are eligible to
apply
- Guarantee of loan repay-
ments up to GBP 5m for
SMEs. Loan guarantee of
80% for loans up to GBP
25m for large firms, be-
tween GBP 45m - GBP
500m in turnover
Cash grant between GBP
10,000 and GBP 25,000,
if firm uses properties
for retail, hospitality or
leisure and a property
value of maximimum
GBP 51,000.
VAT deferral for the
second quarter of
2020
USA Unemployment insurance
payments plus USD 600 per
month, under it the majority
of workers get a replacement
rate over 100
Low interest federal loans
to affected small busi-
nesses
50% payroll tax reduction
for affected firms that do
not layoff workers
Tax payments de-
ferred
Sources:
OECD Country Policy Tracker, 2020
https://www.government.se/press-releases/2020/03/crisis-package-for-small-enterprises-in-sweden/,
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/a9a1127f/covid-19-italy-sets-up-a-wage-compensation-
fund-to-help-employers-overcome-the-crisis
https://ftpa.com/en/new-rules-on-furlough-leave-is-your-company-eligible-to-french-state-aids/
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